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Abstract. How much adversarial noise can protocols for interactive communication tolerate? This
question was examined by Braverman and Rao (IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, 2014) for the case of “ro-
bust” protocols, where each party sends messages only in fixed and predetermined rounds. We consider
a new class of non-robust protocols for Interactive Communication, which we call adaptive protocols.
Such protocols adapt structurally to the noise induced by the channel in the sense that both the order
of speaking, and the length of the protocol may vary depending on observed noise.
We define models that capture adaptive protocols and study upper and lower bounds on the permissible
noise rate in these models. When the length of the protocol may adaptively change according to the noise,
we demonstrate a protocol that tolerates noise rates up to 1/3. When the order of speaking may adap-
tively change as well, we demonstrate a protocol that tolerates noise rates up to 2/3. Hence, adaptivity
circumvents an impossibility result of 1/4 on the fraction of tolerable noise (Braverman and Rao, 2014).
1 Introduction
One of the fundamental questions considered by Computer Science is “What is the best way to
encode information in order to recover from channel noise”? This question was studied most notably
by Shannon, in a pioneering work [Sha48] which laid the foundation of the rich area of information
theory. Shannon considered this question in the context of one way communication, where one
party wants to transmit a message “once and for all” to another. More recently, in a series of
beautiful papers, Schulman [Sch92, Sch93, Sch96] generalized this question to subsume interactive
communication, i.e. the scenario where two remote parties perform some distributed computation by
“conversing” with each another in an interactive manner, so that each subsequent message depends
on all messages exchanged thus far. Surprisingly, Schulman showed that, analogous to the case of
one way communication, it is indeed possible to embed any interactive protocol π within a larger
protocol π′ so that π′ computes the same function as π but additionally provides the requisite error
correction to tolerate noise introduced by the channel.
The noise in the channel may be stochastic, in which error occurs with some probability, or
adversarial, in which the channel may be viewed as a malicious party Eve who disrupts commu-
nication by injecting errors in the worst possible way. In this work we focus on adversarial noise.
Schulman [Sch93, Sch96] provided a construction that turns a protocol π with communication com-
plexity T , to a noise-resilient π′ which communicates at most O(T ) symbols, and can recover from
an adversarial (bit) noise rate of at most 1/240. This result was later improved by Braverman
and Rao [BR11, BR14], who provided a protocol that can recover from a (symbol) noise rate up
to 1/4 − ε and also communicates at most O(T ) symbols.
Both the above constructions assume robust protocols. Intuitively speaking, robust protocols are
synchronized protocols that have a fixed length and a predetermined “order of communication”. In
this class of protocols, each party knows at every time step whose turn it is to speak and whether
the protocol has terminated, since these properties are fixed in advance and independent of the noise
introduced by the adversary. However, one can imagine more powerful, general protocols where the
end point of the protocol or the order of speaking are not predetermined but rather depend on the
observed transcript, that is, on the observed noise. While Braverman and Rao show that for any
robust protocol 1/4 is an upper bound on the tolerable noise rate, they explicitly leave open the
question of whether non robust protocols admit a larger amount of noise.
We address this question by considering two types of non-robust protocols, that allow for greater
adaptivity in the behavior of the participants. First, we allow the length of the protocol to be adap-
tively specified during the protocol by its participants. Next, we consider even greater adaptivity
and allow the party that speaks next in the protocol to be adaptively chosen by the participants
of the protocol. In both these situations, we show that increasing adaptivity allows for a dramatic
increase in the noise resilience of protocols.
We draw attention of the reader to the fact that while for robust protocols, Yao’s [Yao79] model
is almost universally accepted as natural and meaningful, it is far less obvious what is the right
way to model non-robust protocols, or even if there is a unique choice. Defining models to capture
adaptivity is subtle, and several choices must be made, for example in how adversarial noise is
budgeted and in how to model rounds in which there is no consensus regarding who the speaker
is. Different modeling choices lead to different protocol capabilities and we believe it is important
to explore the domian of this very young area in order to find settings that are both natural and
admit protocols with higher noise resilience.
In a recent work, Ghaffari, Haeupler, and Sudan [GHS14, GH14], proposed one natural set of
choices to model adaptivity, and provided efficient protocols in that model which resist noise rates
of up to 2/7, surpassing the maximal resilience of the non-robust case. In this paper we make a
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different, but arguably just as natural, set of choices, which lead to adaptive protocols with even
higher noise resilience. We proceed to summarize the most salient differences in our modeling choices
and the ones of [GHS14].
First, the model in [GHS14] does not permit adaptive modification of the length of the protocol,
while our model does. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to consider varying length
interactive protocols and their noise resilience. The second main difference is that in [GHS14] the
channel may be used to communicate only in one direction at each round. Specifically in [GHS14],
at each round, each party decides either to only talk or to only listen: if both parties talk at the
same round, a collision occurs and no symbol is transferred, and if both listen at the same round,
they receive some adversarial symbol not counted towards the adversary’s budget. In our model,
on the other hand, both parties may talk at the same round without causing any collision (similar
to the case of robust protocols [Sch96, BR14]). The adaptivity stems from the parties’ ability to
individually choose at each round, whether they talk or not.
The two different modeling choices taken by [GHS14] and by us lead to different bounds on the
noise an adaptive protocol can handle. For instance, while the protocols of [GHS14] can handle up
to a relative noise of 2/7, our protocols can resists a higher noise rate of 1/3 if the length of the
protocol may adaptively change, or noise rate of up to 2/3 when both the length and the order of
speaking adaptively vary. We now give more details about our adaptive model and the noise rate
our protocols can resist.
1.1 Our Results: Adaptive Length
We begin by considering adaptive protocols in which the length of the protocol may vary as a
function of the noise, however the order of speaking is still predetermined. Specifically, each party
individually decides whether to continue participating in the protocol, or terminate and give an
output. We denote the class of such protocols as Mterm (see formal definition in Section 2.1).
Intuitively, changing the length of the protocol is useful for two reasons. First, the parties may
realize that they still did not complete the computation, and communicate more information in
order to complete the task. On the other hand, the parties may see that the noise level is so high
that there is no hope to correctly complete the protocol. In this case the parties should abort the
computation, since for such a high noise level, the protocol is not required to be correct anyway.
The difficult part for the parties is, however, to be able to distinguish between the first case and
the second one in a coordinated way and despite the adversarial noise.
If the length of the protocol is not fixed (and subsequently, its communication complexity), the
noise rate must be defined with care. Generalizing the case of fixed-length protocols, we consider the
ratio of corrupted symbols out of all the symbols that were communicated in that instance, and call
this quantity the relative noise rate. We emphasize that both the numerator and the denominator
of this ratio vary in adaptive protocols.
Our main result for this type of adaptivity is a protocol that resists relative noise rates of up
to 1/3 (Theorem 1). The protocol works in two steps: in the first step Alice communicates her
input to Bob using some standard error correction code; in the second step Bob estimates the noise
that occurred during the first step, and then he communicates his input to Alice using an error
correction code with parameters that depend on his noise estimation. In general, the more noise
Bob sees during the first step, the less redundant his reply to Alice would be—if there was a lot
of noise during the first part, the adversary has less budget for the second part, and the code Bob
uses can be weaker.
The communication complexity of our protocol above is a constant factor (where the constant
depends on the channel quality) times the input lengths of Alice and Bob. However, our protocol
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requires the parties to communicate their inputs, even in cases where the lengths of the inputs may
be very long with respect to the communication complexity of the best noiseless protocol; thus, the
rate of this coding strategy (the length of the noiseless protocol divided by the length of the resilient
protocol) can be vanishing when the length of the noiseless protocol tends to infinity. Nevertheless,
our coding protocol serves as an important proof of concept for the strength of this model: Indeed,
in the non-adaptive setting, the rate of the coding scheme has no effect on the noise resilience. E.g.,
an upper bound of 1/4 holds for coding schemes even when their rate is vanishing [BR14].
In addition to our schemes, we show an upper (impossibility) bound of 1/2 on the tolerable
noise in that model (Theorem 2). We emphasize that previous impossibility proofs (i.e., [BR14])
crucially use the property of robustness: in robust protocols there always exists a party that speaks
at most half of the symbols, whose identity is known in advance, making it a convenient target
for adversarial attack. Contrarily, in adaptive protocols the party that speaks less may depend on
the noise and vary throughout the protocol. We provide a new impossibility bound by devising
an attack that corrupts both parties with rate 1/2, and carefully arguing that at least one of the
parties must terminate before it learns the correct output.
Model Lower Bound α Upper Bound β Ref.
(non-adaptive) 1/4 1/4 [BR14]
Mterm 1/3 1/2 §2
Table 1: Summary of our bounds for the Mterm model, compared to the non-adaptive model. α and β are the
lower (existence) and upper (impossibility) bounds on the allowed noise rate: for any function there exists a
protocol that withstands noise rate c if c < α. Yet, there exists a function for which no protocol withstands
noise rate β.
1.2 Our Results: Adaptive Order of Speaking
Next, we define the Madp model in which we allow the order of speaking to depend on the noise (see
formal definition in Section 3.1). Specifically, at each round each party decides whether it sends the
next symbol or it keeps silent; the other side, respectively, either learns the symbol that was sent, or
receives “silence”.4 We stress that silent rounds, i.e. when no message is delivered, are not counted
towards the communication, or otherwise the model becomes equivalent to the Mterm model. We
note that this type of adaptivity also implies a varying length of the protocol, e.g., in order to
terminate, a party simply keeps silent and disregards any incoming communication.
Similar to the Mterm model, the adversary is allowed to corrupt any transmission, and we
measure the noise rate as the ratio of corrupted transmissions to the communicated (non-silent)
symbols. It is important to emphasize that the adversary is not limited to only corrupting symbols,
but it can also create a symbol when a party decides to keep silent, or remove a transmitted symbol
leading the receiving side to believe the other side is silent. This makes a much stronger adversary5
that may induce relative noise rates that exceed 1.
Here we construct an adaptive protocol which crucially uses both the ability to remain silent as
well as the ability to vary the length of the protocol, to withstand noise rates < 2/3 (Theorem 4).
The protocol behaves quite similar to the Mterm protocol that achieves noise rates up to 1/3 with
an additional layer of encoding that takes advantage of being able to remain silent, and provides
another factor of 2 in resisting noise. We name this new layer of code silence encoding. The idea
behind this layer is that using k non-silent transmissions, one can obtain a code with distance 2k.
4 A similar notion of party keeping silent was used in interactive protocols over noiseless channels, by [DFO10, IW10].
5 It is easy to show that unless we give the adversary the power to insert and delete symbols, the model is too
strong and the question of resisting noise becomes trivial: in that case the protocol can encode a ‘0’ as a silent
transmission, and a ‘1’ as a non-silent transmission, thus perfectly resisting any possible noise.
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Then, in order to cause a decoding error, the adversary must invest 122k+1 corruptions, or otherwise
either the correct symbol can be decoded, or the symbol becomes an erasures (which is easier to
handle than an error). Note that for the special case of k = 1, two corruptions are required to cause
decoding of an incorrect symbol (or otherwise, the adversary only causes an erasure).
The main drawback of the above protocol is that its length (i.e., its round complexity) may
be very large with respect to the length of the optimal noiseless protocol; thus it has a vanishing
rate. Next, we restrict the discussion only to adaptive protocols whose length is linear in the length
of the optimal noiseless protocol (thus their rate is a positive constant and not vanishing), and
show a protocol with non-vanishing rate that tolerates noise rates of up to 1/2 (Theorem 5). The
protocol is based on the optimal (non-robust) protocol of [BR14] with an additional layer of of
silence encoding which effectively forces the adversary to “pay twice” for each error it wishes to
make. This way the protocol can withstand twice the number of errors than [BR14].
Model Noise Resilience Non-Vanishing Rate Ref.
non-adaptive 1/4
√
[BR14]
Madp 2/3 §3, §B
Madp 1/2
√
§C
Madp (shared randomness) 1
√
§D
Madp over erasure channels 1
√
§3 (§D)
Table 2: Summary of the noise resilience of our protocols in the Madp model. For any function f , and for
any constant c less than the resilience, there exists a protocol that correctly computes f over any channel with
relative noise rate c. Note that 1 is a trivial impossibility bound for the Madp model, as the adversary can delete
the entire communication.
If we relax the model to permit the parties to share some randomness unknown to the adversary,
then we can construct a protocol that withstands an optimal 1−ε fraction of errors (Theorem 6) and
also achieves non-vanishing rate. The key technique here is to adaptively repeat transmissions that
were corrupted by the adversary: each symbol is sent multiple times until the other side indicates
that the symbol was received correctly. However, now the adversary can corrupt this “feedback”
and falsely indicate that a symbol was received correctly by the other side. To prevent such an
attack we use the shared randomness to add a layer of error-detection (via the so called Blueberry
code [FGOS15]). The adversary, without knowing the randomness, has a small probability to corrupt
a symbol so it passes the error-detection layer, and corrupts the sensitive “feedback” symbols with
only a negligible probability.
An interesting observation is that we can apply our methods to the setting of erasure channels
and obtain a protocol with linear round complexity (i.e., with a non-vanishing rate) and erasure
resilience of 1 − ε without the need for a shared randomness (Corollary 1). We note that for non-
adaptive protocols over erasure channels, 1/2 is a tight bound on the noise: a noise of 1/2 − ε
is achievable via the Braverman-Rao protocol (see [FGOS15]) or via the simple protocol of Efre-
menko, Gelles and Haeupler [EGH15]; on the other hand, a noise rate of 1/2 is enough to erase the
entire communication of a single party, thus disallowing any interaction [FGOS15]. Our protocol
for adaptive settings hints that adaptivity can double the resilience to noise (similar to the effect
of possessing preshared private randomness [FGOS15], etc.). Our bounds for the Madp model are
summarized in Table 2.
1.3 Related Work.
As mentioned in the introduction, the study of coding for interactive communication was initiated
by Schulman [Sch92, Sch93, Sch96] who provided protocols for interactive communication using
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tree codes (see Appendix C for a definition and related works). In his work, Schulman considered
both the stochastic as well as adversarial noise model, and for the latter provided a protocol that
resists (bit) noise rate 1/240. Braverman and Rao [BR11, BR14] improved this bound to 1/4 by
constructing a different tree-code based protocol (which is efficient except for the generation of tree
codes). Braverman and Efremenko [BE14] considered the case where α fraction of the symbols from
Alice to Bob are corrupted and β fraction of the symbols in the other direction are corrupted. For any
point (α, β) ∈ [0, 1] they determine whether or not interactive communication (with non-vanishing
rate) is possible. This gives a complete characterization of the noise bounds for the non-adaptive
case.
Over the last years, there has been great interest in interactive protocols, considering various
properties of such protocols such as their efficiency [GMS11, GMS14] (stochastic noise), [BK12,
BN13, GH14, BKN14] (adversarial noise), their noise resilience under different assumptions and
models [FGOS13, BNT+14, EGH15, FGOS15], their information rate [KR13, Pan13, Hae14, GH15]
and other properties, such as privacy [CPT13, GSW14] or list-decoding [GHS14, GH14, BE14]. We
stress that all the works prior to this work (and to the independent work [GHS14, GH14]), assume
the robust, non-adaptive setting.
The only other work that studies adaptive protocols is the abovementioned work of Ghaffari,
Haeupler, and Sudan [GHS14], which makes different modeling decision than our work. Ghaffari
et al. show that in their adaptive model, 2/7 is a tight bound on fraction of permissible noise.
The length of the protocol obtained in [GHS14] is quadratic in the length of the noiseless protocol,
thus its rate is vanishing. However Ghaffari and Haeupler [GH14] later improve the length to be
linear while still tolerating the optimal 2/7 noise of that model. Allowing the parties to preshare
randomness increases the admissible noise to 2/3. We stress again that the setting of [GHS14] and
ours are incomparable. Indeed, the tight 2/7 bound of [GHS14] does not hold in our model and
we can resist relative noise rates of up to 1/3 or 2/3 in the Mterm and Madp models respectively.
Similarly, while 2/3 is the bound on noise when parties are allowed to share randomness in [GHS14],
in our model, the relative noise resilience for this setting is 1.
We note that interactive communication can also be extended to the multiparty case, following
the more simple two party case, see e.g. [RS94, JKL15, HS14, ABE+15]. The adaptive setting is
particularly relevant to asynchronous multiparty settings (as in [JKL15]) which is closely related
to the Madp model we present here.
Interactive (noiseless) communication in a model where parties are allowed to remain silent (sim-
ilar to the case of the Madp model), was introduced by Dhulipala, Fragouli, and Orlitsky [DFO10],
who consider the communication complexity of computing symmetric functions in the multiparty
setting. In their general setting, each symbol σ in the channel’s alphabet has some weight wσ ∈ [0, 1]
and the weighted communication complexity, both in the average and worst case, is analyzed for a
specific class of functions. Remaining silent can be thought of sending a special “silence” symbol,
whose weight is usually 0. Impagliazzo and Williams [IW10] also consider communication complex-
ity given a special silence symbol for the two-party case. They establish a tradeoff between the
communication complexity and the round complexity. Additionally, they relate these two measures
to the “standard” communication complexity, i.e., without using a silence symbol.
2 Protocols with an Adaptive Length
In this section, we study the Mterm model in which parties adaptively determine the length of the
protocol by (locally) terminating at will. First, let us formally define the model.
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2.1 The Mterm model
We assume Alice and Bob wish to compute some function f : X × Y → Z where Alice holds some
input x ∈ X and Bob holds y ∈ Y. The sets X ,Y and Z are assumed to be of finite size. We assume
Alice and Bob run a protocol π = (πA, πB), over a channel controlled by a malicious Eve. At every
step of the protocol, π defines a message over some alphabet Σ of finite size (which may depend
only on the targeted noise resilience) to be transmitted by each party as a function of the party’s
input, and the received messages so far.
In this model, each party sends symbols according to a predetermined order. Let IA, IB ⊆ N
be the round indices in which Alice and Bob talk, respectively. Note that IA and IB may be
overlapping but we may assume without loss of generality that there are no “gaps” in the protocol,
i.e. IA ∪ IB = N. The channel expects an input from party P ∈ {A,B} only during rounds in IP .
The behavior of Alice in the protocol is as follows (Bob’s behavior is symmetric):
– In a given round i ∈ IA, if Alice has not terminated, she transmits a symbol ai ∈ Σ∪{∅}, where
Σ is the channel’s alphabet and ∅ is a special symbol we call silence.
– At the beginning of any round i ∈ N, Alice may decide to terminate. In that case she outputs
some value, sets TERA = i and stops participating in the protocol. This is an irreversible
decision.
– In every round i ∈ IA where i ≥ TERA, Alice’s input to the channel is the special silence
symbol ai = ∅.
– Eve may corrupt any symbol, including silence, transmitted by either party. Thus, she acts upon
transmitted symbols via the function Ch : Σ ∪{∅} → Σ ∪{∅}, conditioned on the parties input,
Eve’s random coins and the transcript so far. Note that even after Alice has terminated, ai = ∅
is sent over the channel and still might be corrupted by Eve.
Next we formally define some important measures of a protocol. For a specific instance of the pro-
tocol we define the Noise Pattern E ∈ (Σ∪{⊥})∗ incurred in that instance in the following way. As-
sume that Alice sends (a1, a2, . . .) and Bob sends (b1, b2, . . .), then E = ((ea1 , ea2 , . . .), (eb1 , eb2 , . . .))
so that eai = ⊥ if Ch(ai) = ai and otherwise, eai = Ch(ai), and similarly for ebi .
Definition 1. For any protocol π in the Mterm model, we define the following measures for any
given instance of π running on inputs (x, y) suffering the noise pattern E:
1. Communication Complexity: CCtermπ (x, y,E)
∆
= |[TERA − 1] ∩ IA|+ |[TERB − 1] ∩ IB | , where [n]
is defined as the set {1, 2, . . . , n}.
2. Round Complexity: RCtermπ (x, y,E)
∆
= max(TERA,TERB).
3. Noise Complexity: NCtermπ (x, y,E)
∆
=∣∣{i ∈ IA | i < RCtermπ , Ch(ai) 6= ai}∣∣+ ∣∣{i ∈ IB | i < RCtermπ , Ch(bi) 6= bi}∣∣.
4. Relative Noise Rate: NRtermπ (x, y,E)
∆
= NCtermπ (x, y,E)/CC
term
π (x, y,E).
In order to avoid protocols that never halt, we assume there exists a global constant Rmax and
that for any input and noise pattern RC ≤ Rmax. Finally, we say that a protocol is correct if both
parties output f(x, y). We say that a protocol resists ε-fraction of noise (or, resists noise rate ε), if
the protocol is correct (on any input) whenever the relative noise rate induced by the adversary is
at most ε. Note that if a protocol resists noise rate of ε, and the relative noise in a specific instance
is higher than ε, there is no guarantee on the output of the parties.
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2.2 Tolerating noise rates up to 1/3
In this section we show how to use the power of adaptive termination in order to circumvent the
1/4 bound on the noise of [BR14]. Below, we provide a protocol that resists noise rate 1/3 − ε in
the Mterm model.
Theorem 1. For any function f and any ε > 0, there exist a protocol π for in the Mterm model,
that resist a noise rate of 1/3− ε.
Proof. We assume parties’ inputs are in {0, 1}n. We will use a family of good error correcting codes
ECCi : {0, 1}n → Σcin with i = 1, . . . , imax. Each such code corrects up to 1/2− ε fraction of errors
while having a constant rate 1/ci and using a constant alphabet Σ, both of which depend on ε.
The redundancy of each code increases with i, i.e., ci+1 > ci. Moreover, these codes will have the
property that for any x, ECCi(x) is a prefix of ECCj(x) for any j > i. This can easily be done with
random linear codes, e.g., by randomly choosing a large generating matrix of size n × cimaxn and
encoding ECCi by using a truncated matrix using only the first ci columns.
Formally, for any n and ε > 0, let {ECCi} be a family of error correcting codes as described
above and let j be such that cj · 4ε ≥ c1. Set IA = {1, . . . , cjn} and IB = {cjn+ 1, cjn+ 2, . . .}.
1. Alice encodes her input using ECCj , and sends the codeword over to Bob in the first cjn rounds
of the protocol.
2. After cjn rounds, Bob decodes Alice’s transmission to obtain x˜. Let t be the Hamming distance
between the codeword Bob receives and ECCj(x˜).
3. Bob continues in an adaptive manner:
(a) if t < (1/2 − ε)cjn Bob encodes his input using a code ECC : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}2cjn−4t. Note
that the maximal value t can get is (1/2 − ε)cjn which makes 2cjn− 4t > 4εcjn ≥ c1n, so
a suitable code can always be found.
(b) otherwise, Bob aborts.
4. After completing his transmission, Bob terminates and outputs f(x˜, y).
5. Alice waits until round 3cjn and then decodes Bob’s transmission to obtain y˜ and outputs
f(x, y˜).
Suppose an instance of the protocol that is not correct, and let us analyze the noise rate in
that given failed instance. First, note that if Bob aborts at step 3b, the noise rate is clearly larger
than 1/3. Next, assume Bob decodes a wrong value x˜ 6= x. Note, that the minimal distance of the
code is 1 − 2ε, thus given that Bob measures Hamming distance t, Eve must have made at least
(1 − 2ε)cjn − t corruptions. The total communication in this scenario is cjn + 2(cjn − 2t) which
yields a relative noise rate
(1−2ε)cjn−t
3cjn−4t
, with a minimum of 1/3 −O(ε).
On the other hand, if Bob decodes the correct value x˜ = x, and measures Hamming distance t,
Eve must have made t corruptions at Alice’s side. To corrupt Bob’s codeword, she must per-
form at least (1/2 − ε)(2cjn − 4t) additional corruptions, yielding a relative noise rate at least
t+(1/2−ε)(2cjn−4t)
3cjn−4t
=
(1−2ε)cjn−(1−4ε)t
3cjn−4t
which also obtains a minimal value of 1/3−O(ε).
There is still a remaining subtlety of how Alice knows the right code to decode. Surely, if there
is no noise, Bob’s transmission is delimited by silence. However, if Eve turns the last few symbols
transmitted by Bob into silence, she might cause Alice to decode with the wrong parameters. This is
where we need the prefix property of the code, which keeps a truncated codeword a valid encoding
of Bob’s input for smaller parameters. Eve has no advantage in shortening the codeword: if Eve
tries to shorten a codeword of ECCi into ECCj with j < i and then corrupt the shorter codeword,
she will have to corrupt (ci − cj + (1/2 − ε)cj)n ≥ (1/2 − ε)cin symbols, which only increases her
noise rate. Similarly, if she tries to enlarge ECCi into ECCj with j > i, in order to cause Alice to
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decode the longer codeword incorrectly, Eve will have to perform at least (1/2 − ε)cj corruptions
which is again more than needed to corrupt the original message sent by Bob. ⊓⊔
2.3 Impossibility bound
Next, we show that in the general Mterm case, no interactive protocol resists a noise rate of 1/2
or more. At a high level, the attack proceeds by changing 1/2 of both Alice and Bob’s messages so
that whoever terminates first is completely confused about their partner’s input. One must exercise
some care to ensure that the attack is well defined, but this high level idea can be formalized, as
shown below.
Theorem 2. There exists a function f , such that any adaptive protocol π for f in the Mterm
setting, cannot resist noise rate of 1/2.
Proof. Assume f is the identity function on input space {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n, and consider an adaptive
protocol π that computes f . We show an attack that causes a relative noise rate of at most 1/2
and causes at least one of the parties to output the wrong value.
Fix two distinct inputs (x, y) and (x′, y′). Given any input ξ out of the set {(x, y), (x′, y), (x, y′), (x′, y′)}
we can define an attack on π(ξ). The attack will change both parties’ transmissions in the following
way: Alice’s messages will be changed to the “middle point” between what she should send given
that her input is x and what she should send given that her input is x′ (i.e., to a string which
has the same Hamming distance from what Alice sends on x and on x′). At the same time, Bob’s
messages are changed to the middle point between what he should send given that his input is y
and what he should send given that his input is y′.
Specifically, at each time step, Eve considers the next transmission of Alice on x and on x′ (given
the transcript so far). If Alice sends the same symbol in both cases, Eve doesn’t do anything. Oth-
erwise, Eve alternates between sending a symbol from Alice’s transcript on x and on x′. Note that
the attack is well defined even if Alice has already terminated on input x but not on x′,6 although
we only use the attack until Alice aborts on one of the inputs. Corrupting Bob’s transmissions is
done in a similar way.
Next, consider the termination time of the attack on inputs {(x, y), (x′, y), (x, y′), (x′, y′)}. There
exists an input whose termination time is minimal. Denote this input by ξ∗ and assume, with-
out loss of generality, that Alice is the party that terminates first when the attack is employed
on π(ξ∗). It follows that when employing the above attack on any of the other three inputs in
{(x, y), (x′, y), (x, y′), (x′, y′)} \ {ξ∗}, the termination time of the parties are not smaller than Al-
ice’s termination time in the instance π(ξ∗) under the same attack. Without loss of generality,
assume ξ∗ = (x, y).
Finally note that when Alice terminates, she cannot tell whether Bob holds y or y′. Indeed, up
to the point she terminates, the attack on ξ∗ = (x, y) and the attack on (x, y′) look exactly the
same from Alice’s point of view. This is because Bob does not terminate before Alice (for both his
inputs!), and our attack changes Bob’s messages in both instances in a similar way. Thus Alice’s
view is identical for both Bob’s inputs, and she must be wrong at least on one of them. Note that
such an attack causes at most 1/2 noise in each direction up to the point where Alice terminates
(there’s no need to continue in the attack after that point). Thus, the total corruption rate is at
most 1/2. ⊓⊔
One subtlety that arises from the above proof, is the ability of a party to convey some amount
of information by the specific time it terminates. In order to better understand the power of termi-
nation yet without allowing the parties to convey information solely by their time of termination,
6 Recall that once Alice terminates, we assume the symbol ∅ is being transmitted by the channel.
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we define the M †term model, which is exactly the same as Mterm defined in Section 2.1 above, except
that if min{TERA,TERB} 6= Rmax then the parties’ output is defined as an invalid output ⊥.
In Appendix A we analyze protocols in the M †term model which are fully utilized: at every round
both parties send a single symbol over the channel. We show that 1/4 is a tight bound on the noise
in that case. While the protocol of [BR14] is enough to resist such a noise level (even without using
the adaptivity), an impossibility bound of noise ≥ 1/4 is not implied by previous work. In the
appendix we prove the following,
Theorem 3. There exists a function f : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}2n such that for any fully utilized
adaptive protocol π for f in the M †term model, π does not resist a noise rate of 1/4.
3 Protocols with an Adaptive Order of Communication
In this section we extend the power of protocols to adaptively determine the order of speaking as
a function of the observed transcript and noise. To this end, at every round each party decides
whether to send an additional symbol, or to remain silent. We begin by defining the Madp model.
3.1 The Madp model
Similar to the Mterm model, we assume Alice and Bob wish to compute some function f : X×Y → Z
where Alice holds some input x ∈ X and Bob holds y ∈ Y. The sets X ,Y and Z are assumed to
be of finite size. We assume a channel with a finite alphabet Σ that can be used by either of the
parties at any round. Parties in this model behave as follows (described for Alice, Bob’s behavior
is symmetric):
– In a given round i, Alice decides whether to speak or remain silent. If Alice speaks, she sends
a message ai ∈ Σ; if Alice is silent, ai = ∅.
– Eve may corrupt any symbol, including the silence symbol, transmitted by either party. Thus,
Eve acts upon transmitted symbols via the function Ch : Σ ∪ {∅} → Σ ∪ {∅}, conditioned on
the parties’ input, Eve’s random coins and the transcript so far.
– The corresponding symbol received by Bob is a˜i = Ch(ai).
– We assume the protocol terminates after a finite time. There exists a number Rmax at which
both parties terminate and output a value as a function of their input and the communication.
For a specific instance of the protocol we denote the messages sent by the partiesM = (a1, b1, a2, b2, . . .)
in that instance, and the Noise Pattern E = (ea1 , eb1 , . . .) so that eai = ⊥ if Ch(ai) = ai and oth-
erwise, eai = Ch(ai), and similarly for ebi . We will treat E and M as strings of length 2Rmax and
refer to their i-th character as Ei and Mi.
Definition 2. For any protocol π in the Madp model, and for any specific instance of the protocol
on inputs (x, y) with noise pattern E we define:
1. Communication Complexity: CCadpπ (x, y,E)
∆
= |{i ≤ 2Rmax |Mi 6= ∅}|, where M is the message
string observed when running π on inputs (x, y) with noise pattern E.
2. Noise Complexity: NCadpπ (x, y,E)
∆
= |{i ≤ 2Rmax | Ei 6= ⊥}|.
3. Relative Noise Rate: NRadpπ (x, y,E)
∆
= NCadpπ (x, y,E)/CC
adp
π (x, y,E).
As before, the protocol is correct if both parties output f(x, y). The protocol is said to resist ε-
fraction of noise (or, a noise rate of ε) if the protocol is correct (on any input) whenever the relative
noise rate is at most ε. Note that the relative noise rate may exceed 1.
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3.2 Resilient Protocols in the Madp model
In this section, we study several protocols in the Madp model that achieve better noise resilience
than in the robust case. The main result of this section is a protocol that tolerates relative noise
rates of up to 2/3.
Theorem 4. Let X ,Y,Z be some finite sets. For any function f : X × Y → Z there exists an
adaptive protocol π for f in the Madp model that resists noise rates below 2/3.
This protocol builds upon the protocol constructed in Theorem 1 but additionally adds a layer
of coding that takes advantage of the partially-utilizing nature of message delivery in this model,
which we call silence encoding. More formally,
Definition 3. Let X = {x1, x2, ..., xn} be some finite, totally-ordered set. The silence encoding is
a code SE1 : X → (Σ∪{∅})n that encodes xi into a string y1, ..., yn where ∀j 6= i, yj = ∅ and yi 6= ∅.
Intuitively, such an encoding has the property that two transmissions must be corrupted in order
to make the receiver decode an incorrect message, while only a single symbol is transmitted. This,
along with the technique that tolerates relative noise rates of up to 1/3 when only the length of
the protocol is adaptive, yields the claimed result. See Appendix B for full details and proof of
Theorem 4.
While the protocol of Theorem 4 obtains noise rate resilience of 2/3 and very small communica-
tion complexity, it has double exponential round complexity with respect to the round complexity
of the best noiseless protocol. Our next theorem limits the round complexity to be linear, thus
yielding a coding scheme with a non-vanishing rate. Specifically, it shows that for any ε > 0 we can
emulate any protocol π of length T (defined in the noiseless model) by a protocol Π in the Madp
model, which takes at most O(T ) rounds and resists noise rate of 1/2 − ε.
Theorem 5. For any constant ε > 0 and for any function f , there exists an interactive protocol
in the Madp model with round complexity O(CCf ), that resists a relative noise rate of 1/2− ε.
The protocol follows the emulation technique set forth by Braverman and Rao [BR14], and requires
a generalized analysis for channels with errors and erasures as performed in [FGOS15] albeit for
a completely different setting. The key insight is that silence encoding forces the adversary to pay
twice for making an error (or otherwise to cause “only” an erasure). This allows doubling the
maximal noise rate the protocol resists. The proof appears in Appendix C.
Finally, we extend the model by allowing the parties to share a random string, unknown to
the adversary. We show that shared randomness setup allows the relative noise rate to go as high
as 1− ε. Formally,
Theorem 6. For any small enough constants ε > 0 and for any function f , there exists an in-
teractive protocol in the Madp model with round complexity O(CCf ) such that, if the adversarial
relative corruption rate is at most 1−ε, the protocol correctly computes f with overwhelming success
probability over the choice of the shared random string.
The proof appears in Appendix D. At a high level, the main idea is to adaptively repeat
transmissions that were corrupted by the adversary. This turns each transmission into a varying-
length message whose length (i.e., the number of repetitions) is determined by the relative noise at
that message. This forces Eve to spend more and more of her budget in order to corrupt a single
transmission, since she needs to corrupt all the repetitions that appear in a single message. The
shared randomness is used as a means of detecting corruptions (similar to [FGOS15]), converting
most of Eve’s noise into easy to handle erasures. Each detected corruption is replaced with an
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erasure mark and treated accordingly. It is immediate then, that the same resilience of 1 − ε
holds for protocols over the erasure channel, even when no preshared randomness is available: such
channels can only make “erasures” to begin with, so there is no need for preshared randomness in
order to detect corruptions.
Corollary 1. For any small enough constant ε > 0 and for any function f , there exists an inter-
active protocol in the Madp model over an erasure channel that has round complexity O(CCf ) and
that correctly computes f as long as the adversarial relative erasure rate is at most 1− ε.
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Appendix
A The M
†
term model: impossibility bounds
In this section we study upper (impossibility) bounds on the admissible noise in the M †term model.
We consider fully utilized protocols in which both parties send a symbol at every round (i.e.,
IA = IB = N). In this setting we show an impossibility bound of 1/4 on the amount of tolerable
noise, matching the achievable resilience of protocols in this setting [BR14]. Specifically, we provide
an adversarial strategy that always wins with error rate < 1/4. Note that Braverman and Rao
[BR14] showed a similar result for non-adaptive protocols. Informally speaking, their proof goes
along the following lines: Eve picks the player, say Bob, who speaks for fewer slots, and changes
half his messages so that the first half corresponds to input y while the second half corresponds
to y′. Now, Eve’s noise rate is at most 1/4, and Alice cannot tell whether Bob’s input is y or y′ and
cannot output the correct value.
The above strategy does not carry over to the M †term model. Specifically, the above attack is not
well defined. Indeed, Eve can inject messages in the first half of the attack, by running Bob’s part
of π on the input y. However, when Eve wishes to switch to y′, she now needs to run π on input
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y′ given the transcript so far, say, given tr(y). It is possible that π(·, y′) conditioned on tr(y) is not
defined, for example upon occurrence of tr(y) given input y, Bob may have already terminated and
Eve cannot conduct the second part of the attack.
We address this issue by demonstrating a more sophisticated attack that does not abruptly
switch y to y′ after half the messages, but rather gradually moves from y towards y′. That is, at
any time during the protocol the adversary’s relative noise rate is at most 1/4, therefore the parties’
ability to prematurely terminate doesn’t give them any power.7 Recall the statement of Theorem 3,
Theorem 3. There exists a function f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}2n such that for any adaptive
protocol π for f in the fully utilized M †term model, π does not resist a noise rate of 1/4.
Before we prove the theorem we show the following technical lemma, which is the main idea
of our proof. Denote the Hamming distance of two strings by ∆(·, ·). In order to cause ambiguity
when decoding a codeword from {x, y}, one needs to corrupt at most (∆(x, y) + 1)/2 symbols, and
this can be done in a “rolling” manner. Formally,
Lemma 1. Assume F is some finite field. For any two strings x, y ∈ Fn there exists a string z ∈ Fn
such that
∆(x+ z, x) ≥ ∆(x+ z, y)
and for any j ≤ n, w(z1, . . . , zj) ≤ j+12 , where w(·) is the Hamming weight function.
Proof. We begin by proving that when ∆(x, y) is even, a more restricted form of the lemma holds,
namely, that for any j ≤ n, w(z1, . . . , zj) ≤ j2 . We prove this by induction on the hamming distance
d = ∆(x, y). The case of d = 2 is easily obtained by setting z to be all zero except for the second
index where x and y differ. Now assume the hypothesis holds for an even d and consider d+2. Split
x = x1x2 and y = y1y2 such that |x1| = |y1| and ∆(x1, y1) = d (thus ∆(x2, y2) = 2). Let u, v be the
strings guaranteed by the induction hypothesis for x1, y1 and x2, y2 respectively, and set z = uv.
By the way we construct z, it holds ∆(x + z, x) ≥ ∆(x + z, y). Moreover, for any j < |x1| we
know that w(z1, . . . , zj) ≤ j2 , by the induction hypothesis. Note that w(v) is at most 1, and that
v1 = 0 by the construction of the base case. Then it is clear that the claim holds for j = |x1| + 1;
for any j > |x1|+ 1 we get w(z1, . . . , zj) = w(u) + w(v1, ..., vj−|x1|+1) ≤ |x1|2 + 1 ≤ j2 .
Completing the proof of the original lemma (where d can be odd and the weight is ≤ j+12 ) is
immediate. If d is odd we construct z by using the induction lemma (of the even case) over the
prefix with hamming distance d− 1 and change at most a single additional index, which is located
after that prefix. Assume that the prefix is of length nprefix. The claim holds for any j ≤ nprefix due
to the induction hypothesis. For any j > nprefix it holds that
w(z1, . . . , zj) = w(z1, . . . , znprefix) + w(znprefix+1, . . . , zj) ≤
nprefix
2
+ 1 ≤ j + 1
2
.
⊓⊔
We now continue to proving that 1/4 is an upper bound of the permissible noise rate.
Proof. (Theorem 3.) Let f be such that for any y, y′, f(x, y) 6= f(x, y′), for instance, the identity
function f(x, y) = (x, y), and let π be any adaptive protocol for f . Consider the transcripts of π
up to round 10.8 By the pigeon-hole principle for large enough n, there must be y, y′ that for some
x produce the same transcript up to round 10. Let m = min {TERA(x, y), TERA(x, y′)}.
7 In fact, the bound we obtain is 1/4 − O(1/k) where k is the round complexity of pi. Therefore, the only hope to
obtain protocols that resist any noise rate strictly less than 1/4 is having infinite protocols. This is however beyond
the scope of this work, and is left as an open question.
8 10 is obviously arbitrary, and has the sole purpose of avoiding the edge case in which Eve corrupts the first couple
of rounds, possibly causing (a relative) noise rate higher than 1/4.
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The basic idea is the following. Assuming no noise, let t be Bob’s messages in π(x, y) up to
round m and t′ be Bob’s messages in π(x, y′) up to round m. Using Lemma 1 Eve can change
t into t + z (starting from round 10), so that ∆(t + z, t) ≥ ∆(t + z, t′) and Eve’s relative noise
rate never exceeds 1/4. Furthermore, Eve can change t′ into t′ + z′ = t + z and also in this
case Eve’s relative noise rate never exceeds 1/4: the string z′11, ..., z
′
m must satisfy, for any index
10 < j ≤ m, that w(z′11, . . . , z′j) ≤ j+12 (this follows from the way we construct z and the fact that
∆(t′ + z′, t) = ∆(t+ z, t) ≥ ∆(t+ z, t′) = ∆(t′ + z′, t′)). Thus, the relative noise rate made by Eve
up to round j is at most (j−10+1)/22j < 1/4. The same argument should be repeated until we reach
the bound on the round complexity TERπ, which we formally prove in Lemma 2, yet before getting
to that we should more carefully examine the actions of both parties during this attack.
Consider Alice actions when the messages she receives are t + z = t′ + z′. She can either (i)
abort (output ⊥), (ii) output f(x, y) or (iii) output f(x, y′), however, her actions are independent
of Bob’s input (since her view is independent of Bob’s input). Assuming Eve indeed never goes
beyond 1/4, it is clear that Eve always wins in case (i). For case (ii) Eve wins on input (x, y′) and
for case (iii), Eve wins on input (x, y).
However, while in the above analysis Alice’s actions must be the same between the two cases of
t→ t+ z and t′ → t′+ z′, this is not the case for Bob. We must be more careful and consider Bob’s
possible adaptive reaction to errors made by Eve. In other words, Bob, noticing Alice’s replies, may
either abort, or send totally different messages so that his transcript is neither t nor t′. We now
show that even in this case Eve has a way to construct z, z′ and never exceed a relative noise rate
of 1/4.
Lemma 2. Assume π takes k rounds. Eve always has a way to change (only) messages sent by Bob,
so that Alice’s view is identical between an instance of π(x, y) and of π(x, y′), while Eve corrupts
no message up to round 10 and at most (k − 9)/2 messages between rounds 11 and k (incl.).
Proof. We prove by induction. The base case where k ≤ 10 is trivial.
Assume the lemma holds for some even k, and we prove for k + 1 and k + 2. By the induc-
tion hypothesis, Eve can cause the run of π(x, y) and π(x, y′) look identical in Alice’s eyes while
corrupting at most (k − 9)/2 messages after round 10.
Let t denote the next two messages (rounds k + 1, k + 2) sent by Bob in the instance of π(x, y)
and t′ in the instance of π(x, y′).9 There are strings z, z′ such that w(z), w(z′) ≤ 1 and t+z = t′+z′.
Assume we construct z via the the construction of Lemma 1 then also z1 = 0 and z
′
2 = 0. Also note
that t, t′ are independent of errors made in rounds k+1, k+2 (Bob ‘sees’ that his message at k+1
has been changed at round k+2 at the earliest, thus this information can affect only his messages
at rounds > k + 2).
At round k + 1 the amount of corrupt messages (in both cases) is at most
⌊
k − 9
2
⌋
+ 1 =
k is even
k − 10
2
+ 1 ≤ (k + 1)− 9
2
And the same holds for round k + 2 (for both cases). ⊓⊔
With the above lemma, Eve can always cause Alice to be confused between an instance of π(x, y)
and π(x, y′) by inducing, at any point of the protocol, a relative noise rate of at most
k−9
2
2k
<
1
4
.
9 Note that t, t′ are conditioned on the noise Eve has introduced throughout round k.
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Therefore, unless one of the parties aborts10, Alice outputs a wrong output. In all these cases the
protocol is incorrect while the noise rate is at most 1/4. ⊓⊔
Attempts to extend the above proof to work for the fully utilized Mterm model runs into a
hurdle created by parties’ ability to communicate information about their inputs by the time of
aborting. Indeed, in the above attack Alice learns Bob’s inputs (since they were never corrupted),
and Bob might be able to distinguish x from x′ by whether or not Alice has prematurely aborted
(i.e., according to the number of silence symbol implicitly communicated by the channel after Alice
terminates).
B Proof of Theorem 4
We now show that every function can be computed by an Madp protocol that can suffer noise rates
less than 2/3. The main technique used in this section is a simple code that takes advantage of the
‘silence’ symbols, which we call silence encoding defined in Definition 3 for a simple special case,
and below for the general case:
Definition 4. Let X = {x1, x2, ..., xn} be some finite, totally-ordered set. The k-silence encoding
is a code SEk : X → (Σ ∪{∅})kn that encodes xi into a string y1, ..., ykn where all yj = ∅ except for
the k indices y(i−1)k+1, . . . , yik ∈ Σk.
Decoding a k-silence-encoded codeword is straightforward. The receiver tries to find a message xi
whose encoding minimizes the Hamming distance to the received codeword. If the string that
minimizes the distance is not unique, the decoder marks this event as an erasure and outputs ⊥.
The event where the decoder decodes xj 6= xi is called an error. Both encoding and decoding can
be done efficiently.
We note the following interesting property of k-silence encoding: in order to cause ambiguity
in the decoding (i.e., an erasure), the adversary must change at least k indices in the codeword.
Moreover, in order to make the decoder output an incorrect value (i.e., an error), the adversary
must make at least k+1 changes to the codeword. Specifically for k = 1, a single corruption always
causes an erasure (i.e., ambiguity), while in order to make a decoding error, at least 2 transmissions
must have been changed.
We are now ready to prove our main theorem of this section.
Theorem 4. Let X ,Y,Z be some finite sets. For any function f : X × Y → Z there exists an
adaptive protocol π for f in the Madp model that resists noise rates below 2/3.
Proof. The protocol is composed of two parts, similar to the protocol of Theorem 1: in the first part
Alice communicates her input to Bob and in the second part Bob communicates his input to Alice.
After the first part, Bob estimates the error injected and proceeds to the second part only if the
noise-rate is low enough to correctly complete the protocol, or is high enough so that the adversary
will surely exceed its budget by the time the protocol ends (as these two cases are indistinguishable).
In addition, Bob’s message crucially depends on the amount of error Eve introduced in the channel.
Assume the channel is defined over some alphabet Σ and denote one of the alphabet’s symbols
by ‘σ’. For any k ∈ N define π on inputs xi, yj ∈ X × Y in the following way:
1. Alice communicates a k-silence encoding of her input, namely, she waits k · (i− 1) rounds and
then sends the symbol σ for k consecutive rounds.
2. Bob waits until round k|X | and decodes the codeword sent by Alice. Bob adaptively chooses
his actions according to the following cases:
10 As before, Eve needs not corrupt any message after one of the parties aborts, since she is always within her budget.
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(a) if there is ambiguity regarding what xi is, Bob aborts.
(b) otherwise, Bob decodes some xi′ . Let t be the difference between the number of σ symbols
Bob received during those rounds that “belong” to xi′ and the number of σ’s received during
the rounds that “belong” to a value xi′′ , where xi′′ is the 2nd best decoding of the received
codeword (when decoding by minimizing Hamming distance)
Bob communicates his input yj using the following 2t-silence encoding: he waits 2k · (j − 1)
rounds and then sends the symbol σ for 2t consecutive rounds.
Then, Bob outputs f(xi′ , yj) and terminates.
3. Alice waits until round Rmax , k|X |+2k|Y|, and decodes the codeword sent by Bob. If there is
ambiguity regarding the value of yj, Alice aborts. Otherwise, she obtains some yj′ . Alice then
outputs f(xi, yj′) and terminates.
Let us analyze what happens at round k|X |. As mentioned above, in order to cause ambiguity
at that round, Eve must change at least k transmissions. In this case Bob aborts at round k|X |;
observe that neither of the parties communicates any symbol after round k|X |, thus their total
communication for this instance is k symbols. This implies noise rate of at least 1.
If, on the other hand, at round k|X | there was no ambiguity, one of two things must have
happened: either Bob correctly decodes Alice’s input, or he decodes a wrong input. First assume
the latter, which implies that at least k+ 1 corruptions were done. Since there is no ambiguity, we
know that t > 0 and it must hold that Eve made e ≥ k + t corruptions. Then, by the end of the
protocol, the relative noise rate is at least ek+2(e−k) . This value decreases as e increases, up till the
point where e = 2k at which it gets a minimal value of 2/3. Eve has no incentive to perform more
than e = 2k corruptions, this will only increase the relative noise rate without changing the actions
of Bob.
Now assume Bob decodes the correct value, thus Eve wins only if Alice decodes a wrong value
from Bob or aborts. We consider two cases. (i) If Eve has corrupted e < k symbols by round k|X |,
then Bob will send his input via 2t-silence encoding, where t ≥ k − e. Thus, in order for Alice to
decode a wrong value (or abort), Eve must perform at least additional 2t corruptions, yielding a
relative noise rate of at least e+2tk+2t . Under the constraints that 0 ≤ e ≤ k − 1 and k − e ≤ t ≤ k, it
is easy to verify that
e+ 2t
k + 2t
≥ 1− t
k + 2t
≥ 2
3
.
(ii) If Eve has made e ≥ k corruptions by round k|X |, yet Bob decoded the correct value, Eve will
have to corrupt additional 2t symbols to to cause confusion at Alice’s side. This implies a relative
noise rate of at least
e+ 2t
k + 2t
≥ k + 2t
k + 2t
= 1.
⊓⊔
C Proof of Theorem 5
In this section we prove Theorem 5, and show a protocol with resilience 1/2− ε and non-vanishing
rate in the Madp Model. First, let us recall some primitives and notations that will be used in
our proof. We denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n} by [n], and for a finite set Σ we denote by Σ≤n the
set ∪nk=1Σk. The Hamming distance ∆(x, y) of two strings x, y ∈ Σn is the number of indices i
for which xi 6= yi, and the Hamming weight of some string, is its distance from the all-zero string,
w(x) = ∆(x, 0n). Unless otherwise written, log() denotes the binary logarithm (base 2).
A d-ary tree-code [Sch96] over alphabet Σ is a rooted d-regular tree of arbitrary depth N whose
edges are labeled with elements of Σ. For any string x ∈ [d]≤N , a d-ary tree-code T implies an
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encoding of x, TCenc(x) = w1w2..w|x| with wi ∈ Σ, defined by concatenating the labels along the
path defined by x, i.e., the path that begins at the root and whose i-th node is the xi-th child of
the (i−1)-st node.
For any two paths (strings) x, y ∈ [d]≤N of the same length n, let ℓ be the longest common
prefix of both x and y. Denote by anc(x, y) = n− |ℓ| the distance from the n-th level to the least
common ancestor of paths x and y. A tree code has distance α if for any k ∈ [N ] and any distinct
x, y ∈ [d]k, the Hamming distance of TCenc(x) and TCenc(y) is at least α · anc(x, y).
For a string w ∈ Σn, decoding w using the tree code T means returning the string x ∈ [d]n
whose encoding minimizes the Hamming distance to the received word, namely,
TCdec(w) = argmin
x∈[d]n
∆(TCenc(x), w).
A theorem by Schulman [Sch96] proves that for any d and α < 1 there exists a d-ary tree
code of unbounded depth and distance α over alphabet of size dO(1/(1−α)). However, no efficient
construction of such a tree is yet known. For a given depth N , Peczarski [Pec06] gives a randomized
construction for a tree code with α = 1/2 that succeeds with probability at least 1− ǫ, and requires
alphabet of size at least dO(
√
log ǫ−1). Braverman [Bra12] gives a sub-exponential (in N) construction
of a tree-code, and Gelles, Moitra and Sahai [GMS11, GMS14] provide an efficient construction of
a randomized relaxation of a tree-code of depth N , namely a potent tree code, which is powerful
enough as a substitute for a tree code in most applications. Finally, Moore and Schulman [MS14]
suggested an efficient construction which is based on a conjecture on some exponential sums.
We now prove Theorem 5. For any function f and any constant ε > 0, we construct a protocol
that correctly computes f as long as the relative noise rate does not exceeds 1/2 − ε.
Let ε > 0 be fixed, and let π be an interactive protocol in the noiseless model for f , in which
the parties exchange bits with each other for up to T rounds. We begin by turning π into a resilient
version πBR which resist noise rate of up to 1/4 − ε, using techniques from [BR14]. The protocol
takes N = O(T ) rounds in each of which both parties send a message over some finite alphabet Σ
Lemma 3 ([BR14]). For every ε there is an alphabet Σ of size Oε(1) such that any binary protocol
π can be compiled to a protocol πBR of N = Oε(|π|) rounds in each of which both parties send a
symbol from Σ. For any input x, y, both parties output π(x, y) if the fraction of errors is at most
1/4 − ε.
The conversion is described in [BR14]; We give more details about this construction in the proof of
Lemma 4.
Next, we construct a protocol Π that withstands noise rate of 1/2−ε. The parties run πBR, yet
each symbol from Σ is silence-encoded. That is, every round of πBR in which a party sends some
symbol a ∈ Σ is expanded into |Σ| rounds of Π in which a single symbol ‘σ’ is sent at a timing that
corresponds to the index of a in the total ordering of Σ. The channel alphabet used in Π is thus
unary. Decoding is performed by minimizing Hamming distance and the decoder obtains either a
symbol of Σ or an erasure mark ⊥.
From this point and on, we regard only rounds of πBR protocol, ignoring the fact that each
such ‘round’ is composed of |Σ| mini-rounds. Denote by N (i, j) the ‘effective’ noise-rate between
rounds i and j, for which an erasure is counted as a single error and decoding the wrong symbol
of Σ is counted as two errors. Formally, assume that at time n, Alice sends a symbol an ∈ Σ, and
Bob receives a˜n ∈ Σ ∪ {⊥}, possibly with added noise or an erasure mark (similarly, Bob sends
bn ∈ Γ , and Alice receives b˜n).
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Definition 5. Let the effective noise in Alice’s transmissions be
NA(i, j) = |{k | i ≤ k ≤ j, a˜k = ⊥}|+ 2|{k | i ≤ k ≤ j, a˜k /∈ {ak,⊥}}|,
and similarly define NB(i, j) for the effective noise in Bob’s transmissions. The effective number
of corruptions in the interval [i, j] is N (i, j) = NA(i, j) +NB(i, j).
The following lemma states that if the πBR fails, then N must be high.
Lemma 4 ([FGOS15]). Let ε > 0 be fixed and let |πBR| = N . If πBR fails, then
N (1, N) ≥ (1− ε)2N.
With this lemma, the proof of the theorem is immediate: recall that with silence encoding, causing
an erasure costs at least one corruption and causing an error costs at least two corruptions. Observe
that CCadpΠ = CC
adp
πBR = 2N , then if the amount of corruptions is limited to 1/2− ε,
max N (1, N) = (1− 2ε)N < (1− ε)2N
where the maximum is over all possible noise-patterns of at most (1/2 − ε) · 2N corruptions.
Finally, we give the proof for Lemma 4. Parts of this analysis were taken as-is from [FGOS15]
and we re-iterate them here (with the authors’ kind permission) for self containment.
Proof. (Lemma 4.) Let us recall how to construct a constant (non-vanishing) rate protocol πBR
for computing f(x, y) over a noisy channel out of an interactive protocol π for the same task that
assumes a noiseless channel [BR14]. We assume that π consists of T rounds in which Alice and Bob
send a single bit according to their input and previous transmissions. Without loss on generality,
we assume that Alice sends her bits at odd rounds while Bob transmits at even rounds. We can
view the computation of π as a root-leaf walk along a binary tree in which odd levels correspond
to Alice’s messages and even levels to Bob’s, see Figure 1.
root
0 1
0
0 1
1
0
0 1
0
0 1
1
1
Alice
Bob
Alice
Fig. 1: A pi-tree showing the path P (bold edges) taken by Alice and Bob for computing f(x, y). Dashed edges
represent the hypothetical reply of Alice and Bob given that a different path P ′ was taken (when such replies
are defined).
In order to obtain a protocol that withstands (a low rate of) channel noise, Alice and Bob
simulate the construction of path P along the π-tree. The users transmit edges of P one by one,
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where each user transmits the next edge that extends the partial path transmitted so far. This
process is repeated forN = Oε(T ) times. In [BR14] it is shown that unless the noise rate exceeds 1/4,
after N rounds both parties will decode the entire path P . We refer the reader to [BR14] for a
full description of the protocol and correctness proof. We now extend the analysis for the case of
channels with errors and erasures.
To simplify the explanation, assume that the players wish to exchange, at each round, a trans-
mission over Γ ′ = {0, . . . , N}×{0, 1}≤2. Intuitively, the transmission (e, s) ∈ Γ ′ means “extend the
path P by taking at most two steps defined by s starting at the child of the edge I have transmitted
at transmission number e”.
Since Γ is not of constant size, the symbol (e, s) is not communicated directly over the channel,
but is encoded in the following manner. Let Γ = {<, 0, 1, >, } and encode each (e, s) into a string
< z >∈ Γ≤logN+2 where z is the binary representation of (e, s). Furthermore, assume that | <
z > | ≤ c log(e) for some constant c we can pick later. Next, each symbol of Γ is encoded via
a |Γ |-ary tree-code with distance parameter 1 − ε and label alphabet Σ = Oε(|Γ |).11 At time n
Alice sends an ∈ Σ, the last symbol of TCenc((e, s)1, . . . , (e, s)n) = a1a2 · · · an, and Bob receives
a˜n ∈ Γ ∪ {⊥}, possibly with added noise or an erasure mark (similarly, Bob sends bn ∈ Σ, and
Alice receives b˜n). Let TCdec(a˜1, . . . , a˜n) denote the string Bob decodes at time n (similarly, Alice
decodes TCdec(b˜1, . . . , b˜n)). For every i > 0, we denote with m(i) the largest number such that
the first m(i) symbols of TCdec(a˜1, . . . , a˜i) equal to a1, . . . , am(i) and the first m(i) symbols of
TCdec(b˜1, . . . , b˜i) equal to b1, . . . , bm(i).
Let N be as defined in Definition 5. We begin by showing that ifm(i) < i then many corruptions
must have happened in the interval [m(i) + 1, i].
Lemma 5. N (m(i) + 1, i) ≥ (1− ε)(i −m(i)).
Proof. Assume that at time i Bob decodes the string a′1, . . . , a
′
i. By the definition ofm(i), a
′
1, . . . , a
′
m(i) =
a1, . . . , am(i), and assume without loss of generality that a
′
m(i)+1 6= am(i)+1. Note that the Hamming
distance between TCenc(a1, . . . , ai) and TCenc(a
′
1, . . . , a
′
i) must be at least (1− ε)(i−m(i)). It is
immediate that for Bob to make such a decoding error, NA ≥ (1− ε)(i−m(i)). ⊓⊔
Next, we demonstrate that if some party didn’t announce the k-th edge by round i+1, it must be
that the (k−1)-th edge wasn’t correctly decoded early enough to allow completing the transmission
of the k-th edge.
Lemma 6. Let t(i) be the earliest time such that both users announced the first i edges of P within
their transmissions. For i ≥ 0, k ≥ 1, if t(k) > i+ 1, then either t(k − 1) > i− c log(i− (t(k − 1)),
or there exists j such that t(k − 1) > m(j) and i− c log(i− t(k − 1)) < j ≤ i.
Proof. [The proof is taken from [BR14], as this claim is independent of the definition of N .] Without
loss of generality, assume that the k-th edge of P describes Alice’s move. Suppose that for any j
that satisfies i−c log(i− t(k−1)) < j ≤ i both t(k−1) ≤ m(j) and t(k−1) ≤ i−c log(i− (t(k−1)).
Then it must be the case that the first k−1 edges of P have already been announced, and correctly
decoded by Alice for any j in the last c log(i−t(k−1)) rounds, yet the kth edge has not. However, by
the protocol definition, Alice should announce this edge, and this takes her at most c log(i−t(k−1))
rounds, thus by round i + 1 she has completed announcing it, in contradiction to our assumption
that t(k) > i+ 1. ⊓⊔
11 On top of the tree-code encoding, we implicitly perform silence encoding of every symbol in Σ.
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Finally, we relate the effective noise rate with the progress of the protocol.
Lemma 7. For i ≥ −1, k ≥ 0, if t(k) > i + 1, then there exist numbers ℓ1, . . . , ℓk ≥ 0 such that∑k
s=1 ℓs ≤ i+ 1 and N (1, i) ≥ (1− ε)(i− k + 1−
∑k
s=1 c log(ℓs + 2)).
Proof. We prove by induction. The claim trivially holds for k = 1 and for i ≤ 0 by choosing ℓs = 0.
Otherwise, by Lemma 6 there are two cases. The first case is that t(k − 1) > i− c log(i− t(k − 1)).
Let i′ = t(k − 1) − 1 and k′ = k − 1, thus by the induction hypothesis (on i′, k′), there exist
ℓ1, . . . , ℓk−1 ≥ 0 with
∑k−1
s=1 c log(ℓs) ≤ t(k + 1) such that
N (1, i) ≥ N (1,′ i) ≥ (1− ε)
(
(t(k − 1)− 1)− (k − 1) + 1−
k−1∑
s=1
c log(ℓs + 2)
)
= (1− ε)
(
i− k + 1−
k−1∑
s=1
c log(ℓs + 2)− (i− t(k − 1))
)
Set ℓk = i− t(k + 1) to complete this case.
In the other case there exists j such that m(j) < t(k − 1) and i− c log(i− t(k − 1)) < j ≤ i. In
this case we can write
N (1, i) = N (1,m(j)) +N (m(j) + 1, i).
The second term is lower bounded by N (m(j) + 1, j), which by Lemma 5 is lower bounded by
(1− ε)(j −m(j)). We use the induction hypothesis to bound the first term (with i′ = m(j)− 1 and
k′ = k − 1) to get
N (1,m(j)) ≥ N (1,m(j) − 1) ≥ (1− ε)
(
m(j)− 1− (k − 1) + 1−
k−1∑
s=1
c log(ℓs + 2)
)
= (1− ε)
(
j − k + 1−
k−1∑
s=1
c log(ℓs + 2)− j +m(j)
)
for ℓ1, . . . , ℓk−1 ≥ 0 such that
∑k−1
s=1 ℓs < m(j). Take ℓk = i− t(k− 1). Since t(k− 1) ≥ m(j) we get
that
∑k
s=1 ℓs < mj + (i−m(j)) < i+ 1 and
N (1, i) ≥ N (1,m(j)) +N (m(j) + 1, i)
≥ (1− ε)
(
j − k + 1−
k−1∑
s=1
c log(ℓs + 2)
)
≥ (1− ε)
(
i− k + 1−
k−1∑
s=1
c log(ℓs + 2)− i+ j
)
Which completes the proof since for this case i− j < c log(i− t(k − 1)) = c log(ℓk). ⊓⊔
We can now complete the proof of Lemma 4. Suppose the protocol πBR has failed, thusm(N) < t(T ).
By Lemma 7 we have ℓ1, . . . , ℓT ≥ 0 that satisfy
∑T
s=1 ℓs < m(N) < N and
N (1, N) ≥ N (1,m(N) − 1) +N (m(N) + 1, N)
≥ (1− ε)(m(N) − T −
T∑
s=1
c log(ℓs + 2)) + (1− ε)(N −m(N))
≥ (1− ε)
(
N − T − cT log
(
1
T
T∑
s=1
(ℓs + 2)
))
≥ (1− ε)
(
N − T − cT log
(
m(N)
T
+ 2
))
,
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where the second transition is due to the concavity of the log function. Setting, for instance, N =
T c
2
ε log(ε
−1) gives
N (1, N) ≥ (1− ε)
(
N − εN/c2 log(ε−1)− εN log(3N/T )/c log(ε−1)
)
= (1− ε)
(
N − εN/c2 log(ε−1)− ε log(3c2ε−1 log(ε−1))/c log(ε−1)
)
= (1− ε)
(
1− ε1 + log(ε
−1) + c log(3c2 log(ε−1))
c2 log(ε−1)
)
N
> (1− ε)2N,
for a large enough constant c. ⊓⊔
D Proof of Theorem 6
In this section we provide the detailed proof for Theorem 6. For convenience, we re-state the theorem
below.
Theorem 6. For any small enough constants ε > 0 and for any function f , there exists an in-
teractive protocol in the Madp model with round complexity O(CCf ) such that, if the adversarial
relative corruption rate is at most 1−ε, the protocol correctly computes f with overwhelming success
probability over the choice of the shared random string.
We begin with a short motivation for our construction. Our starting point is the protocol of
Theorem 5, i.e., concatenating [BR14] with silence encoding. We need to deal with two issues:
deletion of labels (erasures) and altering labels (errors). First we take care of the errors, which is
done by the technique of the so called Blueberry code [FGOS15]. A Blueberry code with parameter
q encodes each symbol in Σ into a random symbol in Γ , where |Σ|/|Γ | < q. Since the mapping
Σ → Γ is unknown to the adversary, any change to the coded label will be detected with probability
1− q and the transmission will be considered as an erasure. By choosing q to be small enough (as a
function of ε), we can guarantee that the adversary cannot do to much harm by changing symbols.
Next, we need to deal with the more problematic issue of erasures. The problem is that the
[BR14] protocol is symmetric, that is, Alice and Bob speak the same amount of symbols. Thus,
a successful corruption strategy with relative noise rate 1/2 just deletes all Alice’s symbols. To
overcome this issue we need to “break” the symmetry. We will do that by sending indication of
deleted labels: If Alice’s label was deleted, Bob will tell her so, and she will send more copies of
the deleted label. If all of these repeated transmissions are deleted again, Bob will indicate so and
Alice will send again more and more copies of that label. This continues until the total amount of
re-transmissions surpasses the amount of transmissions in the noiseless scenario. This breaks the
symmetry: if Eve wishes to delete all the copies she will end up causing Alice to speak more, which
forces Eve to delete the additional communication as well, which in turn forces her into increasing
the average relative noise rate she introduces.
The remaining issue is to prevent Eve from causing the parties to communicate many symbols
without her making many corruptions, e.g., by forging Bob’s feedback to make Alice send unnec-
essary copies of her labels. This is prevented by the Blueberry code: such an attack succeeds with
very small probability that makes it unaffordable.
Proof. (Theorem 6.) The protocol is based on the protocol of Theorem 5 (i.e., on the scheme
of [BR14]), yet replacing each label transmission with an adaptive subprotocol that allows re-
transmissions of deleted symbols. Furthermore, each transmission is encoded via a Blueberry
code [FGOS15], which allows the parties to notice Eve’s attack most of the times.
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Fix ε > 0 to be some small enough constant. For any noiseless protocol π of length T we will
simulate π in the Madp model using the following procedure, defined with parameters k = ε
−1, t =
kε−1, q < (kt)−2.
1. The parties perform the scheme [BR14] for N = O(T/ε) rounds.
2. In each round, each label is transmitted via the following process:
(a) The sender encodes the label via a Blueberry code with parameter q, and sends it encoded
with a k-silence encoding.
(b) Repeat for t times:
– if the receiver hasn’t received a valid label, he sends back a “repeat-request” encoded
using the Blueberry code and a 1-silence encoding. [Otherwise, he does nothing.]
– each time the sender gets a valid repeat-request, he sends the original message transmis-
sion again encoded with a (fresh instance of) Blueberry code, and k-silence encoding.
(c) The receiver sets that round’s output to be the first valid label he received during step (b),
or ⊥ if all the t repetitions are invalid (either erased, or marked invalid by the Blueberry
code).
First we note that indeed the protocol takes at most O(N) = O(T ) rounds, since the BR
protocol takes O(N) rounds, each of which is expended by at most O(kt|Γ |) = Oε(1) rounds.
We now show that the above protocol achieves noise rate up to 1−O(ε). We split the protocols
into epochs , where each epoch corresponds to a single label transmission of the [BR14] simulation
(i.e., the label and its repetitions are a single epoch).
Next, we divide the epochs into two disjoint sets: deleted and undeleted epochs. The former
consists of any epoch in which the receiver outputs ⊥. The set of undeleted epochs is split again
into two disjoint sets: “lucky” and “non-lucky”. A lucky epoch is any epoch in which Eve’s corruption
is not detected by the Blueberry code.
For each epoch e we define c(e) as the communication made by the parties in this epoch, and
r(e) as the rate of noise made by Eve in this epoch, that is, the number of corruptions Eve makes
in the epoch is r(e)c(e). The global noise rate is a weighted average of the noise rate per epoch,
where each epoch is weighted by the communication in that epoch.
Fix a noise pattern E for the adversary, and assume that the simulation process fails with noise
pattern E. Lemma 4 tells us that the number of deleted epochs plus twice the number of incorrect
epochs (where the receiver outputs a wrong label) must be at least (1− ε)2N . Note that incorrect
epoch must be lucky, and the probability for an epoch to be lucky is at most q · 2t, since there are
at most 2t messages in each epoch and a probability at most q to break the Blueberry code for a
single message. Hence, for our choice of q, the number of deleted epochs is at least (1− 3ε)N with
overwhelming probability.
First, we analyze deleted epochs. The following is immediate.
Claim. In each deleted epoch e, the noise rate is
r(e) ≥ k(t+ 1)
(k + 1)t+ k
= 1− t
kt+ t+ k
≥ 1− ε
while the communication is c(e) ≥ k + t > ε−2 + ε−1.
Next we analyze the non-deleted epochs. We note that c(e) in this case ranges between ε−1
to ε−3, and we now relate r(e) to c(e). It is crucial that whenever c(e) exceeds ε−2, the amount of
noise will be high enough, to maintain a global noise rate of almost one.
First, we deal with “lucky” epochs. For simplification, we assume that if e is “lucky”, then the
noise rate is 0, and the communication is the maximal possible kt + t + 1. We will choose q to
satisfy 2qt · (kt+ t+ 1)≪ 1, so that the effective noise added by such epochs is negligible.
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Then, we need to relate c(e) and r(e) for the rest of the epochs.
Claim. If e is a non-lucky non-deleted epoch, then
r(e)c(e) ≥ max (0 , c(e)− 2k − 1).
Proof. If the epoch is not lucky, then it must have concluded correctly (Bob has eventually received
the correct label). Thus the only attack Eve can perform in order to increase c(e), is to delete Bob’s
reply-request and Alice’s answers up to some point (in addition to corrupting Alice original label).
Thus, Eve must block the first k symbols sent by Alice (as long as c(e) > k), but she must not
block the last k symbols made by Alice. Assume Eve only blocks Bob’s reply-requests. Then she
can block x ≤ t− 1 such requests and make x corruptions out of total communication x+ 2k + 1.
Another possible attack is to let y of Bob’s repeat-request go through (as long y + x ≤ t− 1) but
delete Alice’s replies (again, except for the last one). This will cause yk + x corruptions out of
communication (y + 2)k + x+ 1. ⊓⊔
The relative noise rate caused by any noise pattern E that results in a failed instance of the
simulation is thus bounded by
NR
adp(E) ≥
∑
e: deleted r(e)c(e) +
∑
e: lucky 0 +
∑
e: correct non-luckymax(0, c(e) − 2k − 1)∑
e c(e)
≥ (1− ε)
∑
e: deleted c(e) +
∑
e: correct non-lucky max(0, c(e) − 2k − 1)∑
e: deleted c(e) +
∑
e: lucky(kt+ t+ 1) +
∑
e: correct non-lucky c(e)
.
Recall that with very high probability > (1 − 3ε)N epochs are deleted and at most 2qtN epochs
are lucky. Thus
∑
e: lucky(kt + t + 1) is upper bounded by 2qt(kt + t + 1)N with high probability.
We take q ≪ 1/2t(kt + t+ 1) and neglect this term in the denominator.
Now split the correct non-lucky epochs to two sets: B0 = {e | c(e) ≤ ε−1.5} contains epochs
with “low” communication and B1 contains all the other correct non-lucky epochs (with “high”
communication). For small enough ε,
NR
adp(E) '
(1− ε)∑e: deleted c(e) +∑B1(c(e)− 2ε−1)∑
e: deleted c(e) + |B0|ε−1.5 +
∑
B1 c(e)
≥ (1− ε)
∑
e: deleted c(e) − |B1|2ε−1∑
e: deleted c(e) + |B0|ε−1.5
≥ 1−O(ε),
since
∑
e: deleted c(e) ≥ (1−3ε)(ε−2+ε−1)N and |B0|+ |B1| ≤ (1+3ε)N , with very high probability.
⊓⊔
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